To Know, or To Be, That is the Question: D. H. Lawrence's "Blood Consciousness" and "Mental Consciousness" Reconsidered

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I

Throughout his life, Lawrence is preoccupied by the human action called "knowing." In *Fantasia of the Unconscious* he proclaims quite definitely: "The final aim is not to *know*, but to be. There never was a more risky motto than that: *Know thyself* .... You've got to know yourself so that you can at least *be* yourself. 'Be yourself' is the last motto" (*FU* 68). And this motto is untiringly supported by his life-long assertion that blood consciousness is more essential than mental consciousness. This assertion has a variation from time to time, but the essence of his message is: man has an innate core of being which he calls the "naïve core," but over the time this core is cumulatively covered, and eventually dominated, by man's later attainment of intellect, and this phenomenon has overturned the original balance that man once had: hence the present human ailment of self-consciousness and the loss of spontaneity. What we need to do, then, is to recover this balance. — I think the premise of his assertion needs reconsideration. What does he mean by saying that blood consciousness is dominated by mental consciousness? And if it is, is this such an abominable thing as he asserts? The essential question is whether Lawrence's dichotomy of mental consciousness and blood consciousness, as well as that of "to know" and "to be," are still valid.

His criticism of mind or mental consciousness often takes a radical

form, such as: "The body of itself is clean, but the caged mind / is a sewer inside, it pollutes ..." ("Obscenity," *CP* 463), or, "Sex isn't sin, ah no! sex isn't sin, / nor is it dirty, not until the dirty mind pokes in" ("Sex Isn't Sin," *CP* 463), or yet again, "O you creatures of mind, don't touch me!" ("Noli Me Tangere," *CP* 468), or "That my body need not be / fingered by the mind" ("Chastity," *CP* 469). Or even more candidly: "When the mind makes a wheel which turns on the hub of the ego / and the will, the living dynamo, gives the motion and the speed / and the wheel of conscious self spins on its absolution, absolute / absolute ... absolute consciousness ... absolute self-awareness ... then we see evil, pure evil / and we see it only in man ..." ("What Then is Evil?" *CP* 712). In these poetic expressions he could make his view straightforward and even emotional, but in explanatory discourse he is more sober.

He says that man has two modes of knowing, "blood-knowledge" and "mind-knowledge," the former being primordial. "Blood-knowledge, instinct, intuition, all the vast flux of knowing that goes on in the dark, antecedent to the mind. / Then came that beastly apple, and the other sort of knowledge started .... Thus start KNOWING which shortly runs to UNDERSTANDING, when the devil gets his own." Why is "mind-knowledge" or "KNOWING" so evil? Because "mind-consciousness extinguishes blood-consciousness, and consumes the blood." Lawrence, viewing this way, takes side with the authors of the Old Testament: "They [Adam and Eve] wanted to KNOW. And that was the birth of sin .... No wonder the Lord kicked them out of the garden. Dirty hypocrites." Why are they? Because by desiring to know, they began to watch themselves, and the "sin was the self-watching, self-consciousness. The sin, and the doom. Dirty understanding" (*SCAL* 82). He becomes even more dogmatic in saying: "To *know* a living thing is to kill it" (70).

We should not be perplexed by his rhetorically antagonistic asser-

tion, and try to distinguish the genuine from emotional hyperbole. The most significant point he makes is that there are two modes of knowing. He is so upset by the human predicament, one of its chief aspects being the overwhelming "development" of mental consciousness. This contains an important, and maybe even correct, diagnosis, but a correct diagnosis does not necessarily guarantee the effectiveness of the antidote. What we need is an integral view of "knowing" and consciousness.

II

To show how mental consciousness functions, or dysfunctions, Lawrence takes an example of a child in the bath. He visually describes how the child can't help acting on his ideas and he rubs the soap into his eyes and sucks it and becomes unhappy.

> ... Why? To see the soap and to want it is a natural act on the part of any young animal, a sign of that wonderful naïve curiosity which is so beautiful in young life. But the "he won't be happy till he gets it" quality is, alas, purely human. A young animal, if diverted, would forget the piece of soap at once. It is only an accident in his horizon. Or, given the piece of soap, he would sniff it, perhaps turn it over, and then merely abandon it. Beautiful to us is the pure nonchalance of a young animal which *forgets* the piece of soap the moment it has sniffed it and found it no good. Only the intelligent human baby proceeds to fill its mouth, stomach, and eyes with acute pain, on account of the piece of soap. — Why? Because the poor little wretch got an idea, an incipient idea into his little head. The rabbit never gets an idea into its head, so it can sniff the soap and turn away. But a human baby, poor, tormented little creature, *can't help* acting on his idea: no matter what the consequences. — And

this bit of soap shows us what a bitter responsibility our mental consciousness is to us ...

... At least, education and growing-up is supposed to be a process of learning to escape the automatism of ideas, to live direct from the spontaneous, vital centre of oneself.

Anyhow, it is criminal to expect children to "express themselves" and to bring themselves up. They will eat the soap and pour the treacle over their hair and put their fingers in the candle-flame, in the acts of physical self-expression, and in the wildness of spiritual self-expression they will just go to pieces. All because, really, they have enough mental intelligence to obliterate their instinctive intelligence and to send them to destruction .... This mental consciousness we are born with is the most double-edged blessing of all, and grown-ups must spend years and years guarding their children from disastrous effects of this blessing. ("Education of the People," *RDP* 104-5)

Though the dichotomy is well depicted, one cannot erase completely some doubts, some suspicion of intricate rhetorical sophistry, especially in the comparison between human mental consciousness and animal "instinctive intelligence," stressing that the former is miserable and the latter beautiful. What makes us feel this discussion somewhat unfair is his neglect to acknowledge the positive aspects of mental consciousness. These aspects include logical thinking and the self-reflective function which enables man to take the role of other, hence his ability to sympathize, empathize, and have compassion. At one point Lawrence acknowledges that mental consciousness is a "bitter responsibility" and the "most double-edged blessing of all," which sounds very true, but he immediately jumps to the bold assertion that mental consciousness obliterates the "instinctive intelligence." In other words, he does not

seem to acknowledge that this mental consciousness is an essential and indispensable step toward transcendence to a higher level of being, which is his own goal.

True, he admits in the same essay: "We don't find fault with the mental consciousness, the daylight consciousness of mankind. Not at all. We only find fault with the One-and Allness which is attributed to it" (136). But is this true? Has mankind really made it "One-and-All," obliterating blood consciousness? It is certainly true that there is the "automatism of ideas" in man: we tend to act upon almost any kinds of ideas whenever we are intrigued. It must be our common feeling that it is very difficult to escape from this sort of temptation of ideas. But this praise of animal nonchalance because of the seeming absence of mental consciousness confuses the matter: it confuses epistemology and aesthetics.

To counterbalance, it would be useful to refer to some scientists who express that mental, or scientific understanding and the sense of beauty, or wonder, do not collide. Stephen J. Gould assures that they can coexist, saying: "Both the sense of wonder and the intellectual knowledge should be cultivated with great care. Would we appreciate the beauty of nature less if the harmony of nature is not designed by God in advance? Wouldn't our mind have a sense of wonder or fear if billions of brain cells reside in our cranium?" (36). Paul Davies, British physicist, says in a similar tone: "Both religion and science creates in man a sort of awe, a queer mixed feelings of humility and arrogance. All the great scientists have been moved by the beauty and mystery of the world which they wanted to understand" (319). Richard Dawkins also emphasizes that scientific investigation provokes meaning and sense of wonder in man, saying: "... the spirit of wonder which led Blake to Christian mysticism, Keats to Arcadian myth and Yeats to Fenians and fairies, is the very same spirit that moves great scientists; a spirit which, if fed

back to poets in scientific guise, might inspire still greater poetry" (*Unweaving the Rainbow* 27). From this perspective, he comments on Lawrence, saying that his "poem about hummingbirds is almost wholly inaccurate and therefore, superficially, unscientific .... A large obstacle would have been Lawrence's hostility to what he wrongly thought of as the anti-poetic science and scientists ..." (25). How, then, did Lawrence "wrongly" think?: "But the very idea of taking animals to be role models, as in the bestiaries, is a piece of bad poetic science. Animals are not there to be role models, they are there to survive and reproduce" (211). This is somewhat similar to what Auden contends when he says: "Here Lawrence draws a false analogy between the process of artistic creation and the organic growth of living creatures" (283). Dawkins and Auden both point out the confusion of the different spheres of knowledge. Lawrence must have hated these criticisms, and yet they would shed an interesting light on his treatment of "knowing."

Another example of his view of mental consciousness and blood consciousness is in the preface to Frederick Carter's *The Dragon of the Apocalypse*, where he concedes the function of mental consciousness, saying: "... it is not Reason herself whom we have to defy, it is her myrmidons, our accepted ideas and thought-forms" (*P* 297). This is exactly why he faces the dilemma between accepting the "truth" of the "pock-marked horror of the scientific photographs of the moon" and clinging to, or insisting on the imaginative "truth" of the "white wonder of the skies, so rounded, so velvety, moving so serene." His strategy to defend the imaginative truth is the full use of human imagination produced by blood consciousness, for which only ancient astrological symbols are necessary: "Hints, we have only hints from the outside. But the rest is within us, and if we can take a hint, it is extraordinary how far and into what fascinating worlds the hints can lead us. The orthodox critics will say: Fantasy! Nothing but fantasy! But then, thank God for fan-

tasy, *if it enhances our life*" (303, my italics). Here we can see clearly how Lawrence's epistemology works, where intellectual knowledge must be subservient to the aesthetics which are governed by blood consciousness. Why? Because what is of paramount importance to Lawrence is how to "enhance our life," how to feel truly alive in meaningful ways, and mental consciousness has its merits and *raison d'etre* only if and when it helps it. And that is why he appreciates so much the astrological symbols Carter is talking about: "... the sense of astronomical space merely paralyses me. But the sense of living astrological heavens gives me an *extension of my being, I become big and glittering and vast with a sumptuous vastness. I am the Macrocosm, and it is wonderful*" (293, my italics).

This dichotomizing view of consciousness such as Lawrence's is widely seen in the Romantic tradition where they have reacted against various kinds of mind-oriented worldview. The current question, therefore, can be paraphrased as: how can we reconcile the two different, and often antagonistic, worldviews.

Ken Wilber's view sheds an important light on this question: in his "integral" view, mental consciousness and blood consciousness are never antagonistic. He introduces the idea of "four quadrants," or "four faces of truth." To be more precise, he divides the approaches of the "human knowledge quest" in the history into four parts or "quadrants," according to the approaches of "interior" and "exterior," and "individual" and "collective," naming them respectively: interior-individual "intentional," interior-collective "cultural," exterior-individual "behavioral," and exterior-collective "social." Some might find this classification arbitrary, but the point here is how he views the situation. He says that each area or quadrant is "*equally* significant and important" (*ES* 5), and, because "they each have a drastically different phenomenology," "neither can be reduced to other without remainder" (11). He also says that

each of these quadrants "has its own particular type of truth or type of 'validity claims,'" and therefore: "to say that none of these quadrants can be reduced to the others is to say that none of their respective truths can be dismissed or reduced, either" (12).

As for the Romantic view, having admitted that "... the 'official' and most widespread worldview of the modern West is that of scientific materialism," Wilber points out that "it will do no good, as Romantics wish, to attempt to return to yesteryear, an attempt to 'resurrect' the past with a 'resurgence of the real,' for modernity brought its own important truths and profound insights, which need to be harmonized as well; and yesteryear, full truth be told, just wasn't all that swell" (*IP* 55-6).

Though occasionally asserting that he never "attempts to return to yesteryear," Lawrence nevertheless tries to "resurrect" the past with a "resurgence of the real," and expresses radical doubts on the view that "modernity brought its own important truths and profound insights." This contention or denial of the positive aspects of modernity is brought about by his deep-rooted suspicion of the function of mental consciousness or reason. Seeing the world through reason or rationality is usually considered to be born in the European Renaissance, and reinforced in the following periods of Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment, the pivotal figures being Francis Bacon, Descartes, and Newton: hence the common phrase "Descartes-Newtonian worldview." And this is the main target of the criticism of the Romantics.

This Wilber's idea would make it easier for us to see the characteristics of Lawrence's view. In stressing the importance and significance of blood consciousness, Lawrence tires to reduce the quadrant of mental consciousness to that of blood consciousness. They have their own specific field where their faculty is designed to work in it. In this respect what Lawrence and Wilber say or declare is both "true." A hu-

man baby, as Lawrence tactfully depicts, "*can't help* acting on his idea," but it is nothing to lament over: it is the right function of mental consciousness, as far as it is aware of its sphere to function. It is, indeed, "the most double-edged blessing of all," and that is why it is so important to know the both "edges."

So far Lawrence points out correctly at least the one "edge," the negative one, of the "blessing." But here, typically, he jumps from acknowledging mental consciousness as "a bitter responsibility" to denouncing it as "our great peril," by contrasting, rather erroneously as Auden points out, mental consciousness with the beauty of "the pure nonchalance of a young animal. Again, the point we should not miss is that what mental consciousness does cannot be reduced to the sphere where blood consciousness controls or dominates. In this sense, the baby's "he won't be happy till he gets it" quality is a meaningful one. It is the destiny of the "poor little wretch" to get an idea into his little head, and learn through this experience. No use lamenting over the fact that "the rabbit never gets an idea into its head." This is the way which Wilber calls "honor and incorporate" (*ES*, 12), or "transcend and include." What we should do, according to him, is to integrate both spheres or "validity claims," not to pronounce the dominance of the one over the other.

Wilber summarizes the Romantic view as follows: "... one starts out in unconscious Heaven, an unconscious union with the Divine; one then *loses* this unconscious union, and thus plunges into conscious Hell; one can then regain the Divine union, but now in a higher and conscious fashion" (*ES* 53). One can see that Lawrence would not agree with this view. This is rather the position that Blake, a unique Romantic in this respect, took, who said: "Unorganized Innocence, An Impossibility / Innocence dwells with Wisdom but never with Ignorance" (697). Wilber then says that "the course of human development — *and evolution at*

large — is from subconscious to self-conscious to superconscious; from prepersonal to personal to transpersonal; from under-mental to mental to over-mental ..." Then he concludes: "The Romantics had simply confused pre with trans, and thus elevated the pre states to the glory of the trans ..." (55). This is exactly why he proclaims that "the actual state of the infantile self [is] unconscious Hell" (53).

III

On the basis of the preceding discussion, let us reconsider Lawrence's view of "knowing." He would agree with Wilber's view that the state of the infant is "subconscious," "prepersonal," and "under-mental," but he certainly would not agree with viewing this state as inferior. He keeps praising the beauty of animal's nonchalance and describes human baby derogatorily because he has mental consciousness. But obviously the human baby has less mental consciousness than the grown ups, and in this respect he is better off. The human baby or infant has the same "double-edged blessing" as adults, but he still has possibility of making good use of it — how feeble the possibility might be. Lawrence is sometimes very explicit on this point. He makes Birkin declare "brutally" that man is not spontaneous "'Not because they have too much mind, but too little'" (41). But this is one of relatively fewer statements Lawrence makes. Generally he points out and criticizes the negative side of the "double-edged blessing."

What has become clearer is how Lawrence perceives being "conscious" or "aware." To him, it is mostly the job of mental consciousness, not blood consciousness, and that is the premise of his criticism. Wilber, on the other hand, though seeing the situation in the same way, interprets it as a necessary step, because "the actual course of human ontogeny" is "from unconscious Hell to conscious Hell to conscious

Heaven." In order to get to the final step, one has to go through the step of "conscious Hell" which is largely mind-ridden, and "there it [the self] may spend its entire life" (*ES* 54). This reminds us that in Zen meditation it is said the meditator should go through "Makyo" (Evil Sphere) in order to get to "satori" or the final enlightenment. Wilber emphasizes the importance of this step because the final destination is "conscious" Heaven, not "unconscious." Lawrence never determined his stance on this issue. In fact, his statements vacillate vastly from: "It seems as if the great aim and purpose in human life were to bring all life into the human consciousness. And this is the final meaning of work: the extension of human consciousness" (*P* 430-31), or: "Man is a great venture in consciousness" (*P* 731), or: "Any man of real individuality tries to know and to understand what is happening, even in himself, as he goes along. This struggle for verbal consciousness should not be left out in art. It is a very great part of life. It is not superimposition of a theory. *It is the passionate struggle into conscious being*" (*WL* 486), to: "The moment the human being becomes conscious of himself, he ceases to be himself" (*P* 761), or "The sin was the self-watching self-consciousness. The sin, and the doom. Dirty UNDERSTANDING. (*SCAL* 82), or: "KNOWING and BEING are opposite, antagonistic states. The more you know, exactly, the less you *are*. The more you *are*, the less you KNOW" (106).

As we have discussed, especially in the light of Wilber's "all-level, all-quadrant approach," "to know" and "to be" are not antagonistic: rather they are in the relationship of what Wilber calls "transcend and include." His idea is based on the full awareness of the "vice" of modernity which he lists: "the death of God, the death of Goddess, the commodification of life, the leveling of qualitative distinctions, the brutalities of capitalism, the replacement of quality by quantity, the loss of value and meaning, the fragmentation of the lifeworld, existential dread,

polluting industrialization, a rampant and vulgar materialism — all of which have often been summarized in the phrase made famous by Max Weber: 'the disenchantment of the world.'" This list of the "vice" of modernity, however, is immediately counterbalanced by its "virtues" or "immensely positive aspects of modernism" which "also gave us the liberal democracies; the ideals of equality, freedom, and justice, regardless of race, class, creed, or gender; modern medicine, physics, biology, and chemistry; the end of slavery; the rise of feminism; and the universal rights of humankind" (*IP* 59). His contention is to integrate, or "transcend and include," the two opposing aspects in historical perspective. Referring to "various scholars, from Max Weber to Jurgen Habermas," he says that "what specifically defined modernity was something called 'the differentiation of the cultural value spheres,' which specially means the differentiation of art, morals, and science" (60). In the premodern time, these spheres were not clearly differentiated, and that is why Galileo, for example, could not publish his own discoveries because the church dominated "art, morals, and science." After this differentiation, science was liberated to pursue its own goal, hence all the "vices."

But, Wilber continues, the "'bad news' of modernity was that these value spheres did not just peacefully separate, they often flew apart completely. The wonderful *differentiations* of modernity went too far into actual *dissociation*, fragmentation, alienation" (61). The Romantics are those who see this differentiation as dissociation, and this serves the basis of their dichotomized worldview, in which they "divided the world into Being versus ego. Anything that was ego (or rational, or analytical, or conceptual, or personal, or linear) was viewed as 'bad,' and *anything else* — anything that lacked ego — was thought to be God, or Ground, or Glory" (*ES* 368). Lawrence's dichotomized view is essentially of the same nature.

Charles Taylor sees the current human situation in similar terms:

> There are people who look on the coming of technological civilization as a kind of unmitigated decline. We have lost the contact with the earth and its rhythms that our ancestors had. We have lost contact with ourselves, and our own natural being, and are driven by an imperative of domination that condemns us to ceaseless battle against nature both within and around us. This complaint against the "disenchantment" of the world has been articulated again and again since the Romantic period, with its sharp sense that human beings had been triply divided by modern reason — within themselves, between themselves, and from the natural world. (94)

His view of the current human predicament is essentially the same as that of Lawrence's and Wilber's. On this premise, however, he goes on to say that "part of what is going for instrumental reason is that it enables us to control our environment," and he adds "two other important contexts ... from which the stress on instrumental reason has arisen." They are: 1: Seeing ourselves as disengaged reason gives us "a moral ideal, that of a self-responsible, self-controlling reasoning," and 2: the "affirmation of ordinary life ... has made us give unprecedented importance to the production of the conditions of life in ever-greater abundance and the relief of suffering on an ever-wider scale" (103-4). This latter point is articulated in more straightforward way by Dawkins. Endorsing Carl Sagan's phrase: "I don't think at the guts (by instinct)" (*A Devil's Chaplain* 58), he asserts: "We are the apes which have evolved tremendously, and our brain is designed solely for understanding petty worldly things in order to survive in the African savanna in the Stone Age" (85). Such a view is often denounced as reductionist, but his essential statement shares some points with that of Taylor's and Wilber's: mental consciousness or instrumental reason has developed or evolved in order to survive, and then to make our life better and more

comfortable. They all stress the inevitability of such development. The vital difference Dawkins shows is his complete reductionist view, epitomized in the phrase "designed solely for." Taylor and Wilber admit that instrumental reason has developed inevitably, but they do not think that it is the sole reason.

What Lawrence, then, overlooks is the inevitability of the evolutionary process of human development. Wilber's criticism of the "New Age" thinkers, who are in a way heirs of Lawrence, could be applicable to Lawrence:

> ... many people [in humanistic / transpersonal circles] confuse the warmth and heart-expanse of postconventional awareness with the merely subjective feelings of the sensory body, and, caught in this pre/post fallacy, recommend merely bodywork for higher emotional expansion, when what is *also* required is postformal cognitive growth, not simply preformal cognitive immersion. Obviously bodywork has an important and fundamental role to play in growth and therapy, but the elevation of preformal sensations to postformal love has caused endless problems in the human potential movement. (*IP* 120)

Of course what Lawrence describes, especially the description of sexual encounter, is not a mere "preformal cognitive immersion" or "preformal sensations." On the contrary, he tries hard to make clear that those "genuine" sexual contacts take place in the transcendental sphere. An obvious example is the one between Ursula and Birkin in the "Excurse" chapter of *Women in Love*, and another is the ones in *Lady Chatterley's Lover*.

In the latter, sexual contacts of Connie and Mellors are attempts to describe genuine human relationship through, to use Wilber's term, the

"eye of Spirit," that is, the attempt to represent spiritual reality appears in the physical realm. Lawrence attempts to show that something fundamentally different happens in and after the ideal sexual encounter, that is, some mysterious transformation occurs superficially in the realm of body, but in reality it occurs in the realm of spirit.

His effort is, to some deep-reading readers, obvious enough, but the general reader is apt to take it as something like "resurrection of the body" or "body should be over mind" sort of philosophy. Lawrence is partly to blame for this type of reading; his emphasis on blood consciousness over mental consciousness being one of the major reasons. By this emphasis, he in a way reverses the importance: it is the importance of Spirit which he tries to show, but he is very often taken as a proclaimer or advocate of the "resurrection of the body." And indeed he sometimes seems to believe wholeheartedly in the importance of the latter. His praise of the realm of body or, to use Wilber's terms, "sensibilia" and critique of the realm of mind or "intelligibilia" are from time to time overwhelming. At times his reverence for the Holy Ghost and its various products, such as "star-equilibrium" or "otherness" or "chastity," to name a few, is glorified over the body. This shift or vacillation of emphasis confuses the reader, and this most likely reflects Lawrence's own confusion. He very obviously seeks the possibility of emerging the realms of "transcendelia" through the mysterious relation of man and woman, often in the case of sexual intercourse, guided by the Holy Ghost, in the realm of "sensibilia." But he more often than not fails to make the following clear enough: the body or "sensibilia" is the ground through and on which "transcendelia" opens up where some mystical phenomena take place, and it is not something to "resurrect" over the mind.

It is ironic that while Lawrence wants to show the realm of Spirit, how it looks if one sees the cosmos through the "eye of Spirit," he con-

verts the direction toward the flesh. When Lady Chatterley first sees Mellors washing himself, it is a visionary experience: "it had hit her in the middle of her body" (66). It is her Spirit that perceives the scene as "visionary." Her mental consciousness tries to degrade the experience, telling her that it is "merely a man washing himself! Commonplace enough, heaven knows." But her Spirit knows the truth — it is a visionary experience. True, it is "merely" his body she watches, but in reality she sees it, or the whole scene for that matter, through her "eye of Spirit." The experience is so rare and, above all, disturbs her everyday mental consciousness which revolts and rejects the vision. But the point is not that she sees it through her blood consciousness, but her "eye of Spirit." Obviously Lawrence uses the former to signify the latter. But since "blood" connotes the flesh so strongly, his intention is, without his notice, reverted toward the direction of the flesh, not the Spirit. He is so hasty in going on the attack of "mental life" typified by Clifford and his Cambridge friends, and that hastiness itself forcefully takes him into the praise of blood and the flesh, which, again, betrays his intention.

IV

I say "betray" because his philosophy at one level clearly grasps the core of the issue. In an often-quoted passage from "Introduction to These Paintings," he again soberly states: "The true great discoveries of science and real works of art are made by the whole consciousness of man working together in unison and oneness: instinct, intuition, mind, intellect all fused into one complete consciousness, and grasping what we may call a complete truth, or a complete vision, a complete revelation in sound" (*P* 573-74). His goal is to attain this "complete consciousness" which necessitates the fusion of instinct and mind, or blood

consciousness and mental consciousness. The whole problem of Lawrence is that this clear-cut awareness is less embodied in his works, both creative and discursive, than is expected. That is, despite sporadic expressions of such awareness, far more weight is placed on the importance, and hence recovery, of the flesh and blood consciousness.

In the same essay he says:

> The mind and spirit alone can never really grasp a work of art, though they may, in a masturbating fashion, provoke the body into an ecstasized response. The ecstasy will die out into ash and more ash. And the reason we have so many trivial scientists promulgating fantastic "facts" is that so many modern scientists likewise work with the mind alone, and *force* the intuitions and instincts into a prostituted acquiescence. The very statement that water is H_2O is a mental *tour de force.* With our bodies we know that water is *not* H_2O, our intuitions and instincts both know it is not so. But they are bullied by the impudent mind. (574)

This is very true: the only thing he overlooks is that there are various modes of knowing including the one that sees water as "H_2O," which is also true in its own "quadrant." Mental knowledge is another authentic mode of knowledge which has its own merits and limits. The problem occurs when one of them starts to assert that it is the only true mode of knowing. Paul Davies says: "In the case of organic body, no one denies that its organs consist of atoms. The mistake is to think that they are nothing but the conglomerate of atoms" (84). Or Douglas Hofstadter adroitly puts it: "It is wrong to ask in which way we should understand the world, holistically or reductively. It depends on what you want to know" (qtd. in Davies, 86). Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers also express the same view: "It is possible to express one system in various

languages and viewpoints, but they are complementary. They all deal with one reality, but it is impossible to reduce them to a single discourse. The fact that there are multiple views which are irreducible to each other means that there can be no such thing as God's view which sees the reality as a whole" (298-99). Artistic, aesthetic, scientific, subjective, objective — all these modes of knowing are true, but only in their quadrants. Once one of them intrudes its view upon the others, insisting that it the only true one ("God's view"), confusion sets in. Lawrence deeply penetrates this complicated condition concerning human "knowing": in fact his life-long efforts set out to settle the confusion by recovering the original balance. But in its course, he puts too much weight on the side of "intuitions and instincts," which upsets the balance to the opposite direction.

Graham Hough says that "integration or balance of forces ... for him is the key to the whole vital process," and then: "neither can it [the reconciliation] be achieved by giving the victory to the Flesh and allowing it to lead the Spirit captive — a procedure of which Lawrence is often accused" (227). My discussion may seem another attempt of accusation, but my whole point is that Lawrence's clear awareness that "integration and balance is the key" unfortunately comes only spasmodically and is thus not fully developed and embodied in his treatment of "to know" and "to be." As Donald Gutierrez points out, on the contrary to the common view, it would be correct to call him a "monist" rather than a "dualist" (qtd. in Montgomery 15), for he understands, or at least notices, the complex relation of duality and trinity. In the trinity the third power reconciles the two opposing forces so that duality virtually dissipates, but the polarity remains since it is the essential basis of trinity. Lawrence, however, continues to see the situation in a dual way and does not seem to understand the dynamism well enough to give both blood consciousness and mental consciousness their due. For him, "to

know" and "to be" remain antagonistic states, never reconciling. Robert Montgomery states that because of the "difficulty ... in the inability of the human intellect and of language to grasp a relation in which the three are one, the one is three," the "emphasis swings irresistibly from one aspect to its counterpart ... never able except at moments to hold the two in balance" (17). This aptly explains the difficulty Lawrence was trapped in. But his most essential difficulty seems to lie in his Romantic inclination. His life-long hatred and reaction against the overwhelming tide of the age — positivism, scientism, reductionism, industrialism, materialism, the death of God, the loss of value and meaning — urges him to vacillate between the clear vision and the "reactionism," and that vacillation ultimately blurs his vision and disturbs the efforts toward real integration of "to know" and "to be."

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